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Billions of people are likely to be displaced by climate change. But calling them ‘climate refugees’ oversimplifies the complex reasons why people flee their homes, Sanjay Chaturvedi in part one of a series on migration
In the world of migration law, no one has successfully defined what a ‘climate refugee’ is. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees does not endorse the term. Worse, the term ‘refugee’, as endorsed by the 1951 Convention with its focus on fear of persecution, is unlikely to be of any value to those displaced by natural disasters or climate change – unless all concerned accept that ‘nature’ or ‘environment’ or ‘climate’ may be a persecutor.
Human mobility, compressed in the term ‘migration’, is not universal or linear – it resists a simple definition. Climate-induced migration is no less complex, and in the search for the term ‘climate refugee’, the world runs the risk of ignoring the many interrelated issues that drive people to move from one place to another, including unsustainable development, natural disasters and climate change.
From a geo-historical perspective, the decision to move from one place to another to escape risks and threats posed by environmental and climate change was an integral part of human adaptation. And yet ‘climate refugees’ are sometimes labeled as a national security problem, when the issue of climate migration could just as easily have been approached and addressed, for example as a ‘human rights’ or ‘development’ issue.
The growing view of climate-induced migration as a security issue, especially in a geopolitical climate of fear, sees homeland security responses aimed at border protection. The plight of irregular ‘transit migrants’ remains relatively unnoticed as they traverse countries – with their own immigration laws and border controls – acting as buffers for the destination countries.
The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) pay close attention to the interdependence of climate, ecosystems and biodiversity, and human societies. It says the impact of climate change, risks and adaptation management must be addressed in conjunction with – and not separated from – non-climate global trends. These include loss of land and marine biodiversity, unsustainable use of natural resources, land and ecosystem degradation, urbanization, human demographic transformations, social and economic inequalities, and a pandemic.
The IPCC points out with great confidence that climate and weather extremes are increasingly driving displacement and involuntary migration across regions. But “vulnerability of ecosystems and people to climate change differs significantly between and within regions, driven by patterns of intersecting socio-economic development, unsustainable sea and land use, inequality, marginalization, historical and ongoing patterns of inequality such as colonialism and government.” .
Some 3.6 billion people already live in contexts that are very vulnerable to climate change, according to the IPCC. Similarly, the CIFRC World Disaster Report 2020 says the impact of climate change is now seriously undermining the livelihoods of ‘millions’ around the world, especially in developing economies.
The total number of people identified in the report as being directly affected by climate and weather-related disasters over the past decade – 1.9 billion – is both telling and frightening.
The report describes climate change as a risk multiplier and rightly points out that those who are disrupted and displaced due to environmental degradation and / or natural disasters are much more vulnerable due to existing threats. These include habitat loss, depleted social capital, weakened socio-economic resilience and already precarious life in crowded camps, especially for women, children and the elderly. And yet migrants, especially those of the irregular anonymous kind, are conspicuous and largely absent in various disaster plans and policy action responses.
Regional instruments such as the 1969 Convention on African Unity (OAU) and the Cartagena Declaration of 1984, in addition to the inclusion of region-specific features in their broad definitions, emphasized that the categorical understanding of a refugee should move away from a geopolitical dictated principle of ‘justified fear’ of ‘persecution’ to address the plight of those fleeing civil unrest, war and violence, and climate-induced or multiplied disasters, whether or not it can provide a well-founded fear of persecution.
More importantly, how does one ensure that the category of ‘climate refugees’ is defined by the well-founded fear of the ‘victims’ of climate change seeking protection and care, and not by the largely unfounded fear of those who suspect their borders. going to be violated by thousands and millions of helpless climate migrants, especially from developing economies?
The challenge is to ensure that any attempt to broaden and deepen the humanitarian space by introducing the category of ‘climate refugees’ is progressive, emancipatory and inclusive, rather than regressive, oppressive and exclusive.
The challenge is further exacerbated by the gap in international legal protection in the case of transboundary movements caused or aided by environmental crises, natural disasters and the effects of climate change.
In the spider web of climate-induced mobility / migration, it is difficult to distinguish neatly between ‘environmental migration’ and ‘climate migration’. No surprise that these categories retain their moral appeal but are still disputed. The who, how, when and where of the millions of emerging ‘climate refugees’ are unknown.
And yet it seems that this category of climate-induced migration has attracted the strategic attention and imagination of both ‘national security’ and ‘human security’ narratives. How many of these millions of migrants can be neatly categorized as ‘climate migrants’ or ‘climate refugees’? This is a difficult but important question to answer.
The worryingly high numbers are tempting, especially for those involved in scenario building and risk assessment exercises for the market and the military. But the need for those at risk is location-sensitive, location-specific and community-centric.
The issue requires and deserves to be approached in conjunction with – and not separated from – other forms of migration of this Anthropocene era, one characterized by unprecedented acceleration of human impact on the earth.
Sanjay Chaturvedi es Professor of International Relations at the University of South Asia. He is the co-author of Climate Terror: A Critical Geopolitics of Climate Change (with Timothy Doyle), Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
This article is part of a Special Report on the ‘Changing Face of Migration’, published in collaboration with the Calcutta Research Group.
Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info ™