Last week the Russian army opened one new front in his invasion of Ukraine.
Launching an offensive in the Kharkov region, Russian forces quickly advanced several kilometers and managed to reoccupy several villages liberated during Ukraine's successful offensive in September 2022. They have not yet reached the main defense line east of the city reached, which is in the hands of brigades better equipped and more experienced than those closer to the border. But the situation is serious.
By threatening Ukraine's second-most populous city, Russia hopes to tie up Ukrainian resources in the region, exposing its front elsewhere. Ukraine's immediate priority is to stabilize the front line and prevent a major Russian breakthrough, which it may well do. But it faces a series of challenges that have piled up since last year and won't be resolved anytime soon. Despite the recent death of the relief bill in Congress, which has released billions in aid for Kiev, things are likely to get worse before they get better.
Russia's goal is not to take Kharkov, but to threaten it by advancing on the city and threatening it with artillery. Although Russia does not have sufficient troops to attack the city itself, the operation is intended to create a dilemma. The Ukrainian armed forces are already stretched relatively thin; By drawing Ukrainian reserves and better units to Kharkov's defenses, the Russian attack weakens other parts of the front line. Russia remains focused on occupying the rest of the Donetsk region in the east, seeking major transit and population centers.
In recent days, some Ukrainian units have already been transferred from Donetsk to Kharkiv, and it appears that Ukraine is deploying individual battalions to reinforce other parts of the front. This threatens to make the Ukrainian forces in Donetsk even more vulnerable if Russia deploys its reserves in that direction. Russian forces are also exerting pressure near Kupiansk, east of Kharkiv and in the southern Zaporizhia region. Raids along the border in the Sumy and Chernihiv regions may be imminent.
The Russian offensive comes at a time of vulnerability for Ukraine. Since last fall, the country has faced three interrelated problems: lack of ammunition, manpower and reinforcements. Ukraine has made progress this spring in improving its fortifications, and the United States aid package should ease its ammunition shortages. But Ukraine's manpower has continued to deteriorate, especially where it counts: in the infantry.
Ukraine's counteroffensive last summer culminated primarily due to infantry depletion, and the country has struggled to make up for those losses ever since. In practice, this means that there are often too few soldiers manning the trenches and not enough infantry to develop a sustainable rotation, which threatens exhaustion over time. This also has the damaging effect of discouraging others from volunteering. Many Ukrainian brigades are too weak and many soldiers are over forty.
To be clear: Ukraine is not without men. The situation is the result of policy choices, a rickety mobilization system and many months of political intransigence before the recent passage of a series of mobilization laws. These laws are intended to increase the pool of soldiers by reducing draft age of eligibilitypunishing those who try avoid serviceallow some convicts serving and encouraging volunteers. They promise to tackle Ukraine's manpower problem, but much will depend on how these are implemented. In any case, it will take months for the situation to improve.
Lacking sufficient troops and short of ammunition, the Ukrainian army is responding to Russian breakthroughs by moving its best brigades and elite units along the front. This firefighting approach, which took place during the battles of Bakmut And Avdiikameans that the best units do not have enough time to rest and recover. Ukraine is also resorting to deploying individual battalions piecemeal to reinforce parts of the front without the rest of their brigade. These are short-term solutions that have longer-term consequences as these units degrade over time.
Russia, on the other hand, managed to address its manpower problems last year and is now recruiting approx 30,000 contract soldiers per month. Many of these recruits are certainly not ideal soldiers and are also in their forties. But this physical advantage – combined with artillery, drones and hover bomb attacks – has given Russia a quantitative advantage.
Yet the Russian advantages are not necessarily decisive. The quality of its armed forces, along with leadership losses, have limited Russia's ability to conduct large-scale operations. That is why Russian forces have struggled to turn progress into breakthroughs and have not been able to make more significant gains. Russia is also burning equipment, most of it from storage, and will face equipment shortages by 2025.
Even with the passage of the US aid bill, Ukraine faces a difficult year. American aid has bought Ukraine time and provides certainty about the resources that will be available. The funding could be enough for Ukraine to maintain and, at best, restore the offensive potential of its military. It offers an opportunity. But the future depends on what the West – which plays an important role in training, intelligence and other forms of support – and Ukraine can make of it.
If Ukraine can limit Russia to modest gains this year, Moscow's opportunity will likely disappear and its relative advantage will begin to decline in 2025. This is not just a matter of Ukraine receiving ammunition and weapons from the West, but also of effectively managing the armed forces, addressing the long-term manpower shortage and mounting a good defense. Ukraine will have to defend itself and at the same time work to rebuild its army. There is still a lot at stake in the coming months.