Rob Rabel
Professor Emeritus Roberto Rabel is a professor at the Center for Strategic Studies at the Te Herenga Waka-Victoria University of Wellington and a visiting professor at the University of Warsaw.
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Remark
Indo-Pacific criticism of Russia should rest less on Putin’s character regime and more about what his behavior means for peace and prosperity
There has been much speculation about the implications of Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine for the Indo-Pacific region. What it could mean for Chinese designs in Taiwan has received particular attention. Some argue it will define China, because of the robust and united Western response to Russian aggression. Others suggest that this war in Europe is a strategic distraction for the United States, which will shift its focus and resources away from the Indo-Pacific, facilitating China’s path to regional dominance.
As these competing reviews suggest, there is room for debate about the likely significance of the conflict in Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific. Much depends on developments in the war and subsequent relations between the West, Russia and others.
However, there is already one feature of the region’s response to the war that deserves attention. While China’s attitude has not surprised many in the West, there is disappointment with that of the world’s largest democracy, India. But Delhi’s cautious response is by no means unique. With the exception of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, most in the region have adopted a “neutral” stance, like India’s.
Why did so many countries in the Indo-Pacific take stances on the war in stark contrast to those of Europe and the United States? The reasons vary, but if you listen to Indian policy makers and academics, their response is based on realistic considerations of national interests. For India, it means not upset Moscow lest it move closer to China, compounded by Delhi’s continued reliance on Russian weapons. For others, the war is a distant, intra-European affair that must be settled quickly between the warring parties, especially since it already has negative economic consequences worldwide. For all of them, pragmatism has prevailed over principle.
Worryingly, these pragmatic regional responses show a disregard for Russia’s flagrant violation of international law and standards, including the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. If China can’t even mildly reprimand Moscow, it’s sending a signal to the world that Beijing’s growing partnership with Putin is more important than its usually adamant insistence on the inviolability of sovereign borders and non-interference in the internal affairs of others. Similar responses based on Realpolitik calculations by other states suggest that it would be naive to expect stability in the Indo-Pacific to be maintained simply by mutual respect for a rules-based order rather than forms of order based on what can enforce power.
This reality is arguably the most important lesson for democracies in terms of what the differing responses to the war in Ukraine confirm about the Indo-Pacific — and predict its future.
There are several associated implications. One is the need for democracies to prioritize cooperation with each other in the knowledge that increasing democratic space in the Indo-Pacific will be a challenge. Another implication, however, is that democracies must work with like-minded and disparate states to ensure conflicts like the one raging in Ukraine are avoided in the Indo-Pacific.
The region’s dominant response to the crisis in Ukraine also casts doubt on the effectiveness of a dichotomous divide between democracies and autocracies, as the Biden administration tends to do. When states are measured by this yardstick in their responses to the war, countries like India, Indonesia or Malaysia don’t seem quite aligned with the democratic camp. While they may be imperfect democracies, are they more than Hungary or Ukraine itself? Is it wise to rate them this way?
A more judicious approach would be to recognize how different interests have influenced their views. After all, those who have supported Ukraine are acting just as much on the basis of interests as those who have abstained. Support for Ukraine has favorably aligned the interests and values of states such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan.
That does not mean ignoring values and letting interests dominate exclusively. Rather, democracies need to develop smarter strategies based on emphasizing the importance of ground rules of international order. To be credible in the Indo-Pacific, criticism of Russia must rest less on the character of its regime, evil as it may be, and more on what its conduct means for peace and prosperity, both globally and regionally. Singapore’s ‘principled’ response to the war is very much framed in this way.
Thus, a two-pronged approach is needed in the Indo-Pacific: in addition to strengthening solidarity between democracies, the importance of rules-based approaches must be emphasized. The diverse nature of the region was evident in the differing responses to the violations of sovereignty and the blatant aggression that Putin unleashed against Ukraine. In this context, it is critical for all states in the region to understand how their own interests would be endangered if Russia’s actions were repeated by a power in the Indo-Pacific. In a region of disparate states with often conflicting interests, adherence to the ground rules of the international order is essential to maintain the peace and prosperity that have made the Indo-Pacific the most dynamic region in the world in recent decades. Realism demands nothing less.